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THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 REVISITED: THE 
NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM 
SCOTT C. WHITNEY* 
Approximately four months after President Ford signed into law the 
Trade Act of 197 4,1 the first petition for import relief was filed invoking 
the "liberalized" provisions of Title II. 2 In the three years since the effec-
tive date of the 1974 Act, the United States International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) has instituted investigations concerning a wide variety of com-
modities.3 Nonetheless, even though Congress by enacting the 1974 Act in-
tended to minimize the President's control over trade policy and to make 
import relief more accessible to both industry and labor, the ITC's recom-
mendations have rarely been followed. This article will analyze the ineffec-
tiveness of the 1974 Act by outlining the background of this new statute, 
discussing the resolution of specific cases faced by the ITC since 1974, and 
considering reasons why the Act has not lived up to original expectations. 
Changes will be suggested which are necessary to achieve a viable interna-
tional trade policy. Specifically, the article will focus on the critical issue of 
the extent to which the Executive has been responsive to the findings and 
recommendations of the ITC in those reports which have made affirmative 
determinations and have recommended import relief of various kinds. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 
Under the Trade Act of 1974, import relief may take the form of 
offsetting duty increases, tariff rate quotas, quantitative restrictions, use of 
orderly marketing agreements with foreign countries, or any combination 
of these measures.4 Furthermore, adjustment assistance for workers, firms, 
and communities is available under the statute as a satisfactory alternative 
to import relief.5 This article, however, will not analyze which specific type 
':'A.B., University of Nevada; J.D., Harvard University; Professor of Law, College of 
William and Mary. The author wishes to thank Philip H. Bane, a third year law student at the 
College of William and Mary, for his valuable assistance in researching and drafting this arti-
cle. 
1 19 u.s.c. §§ 2101-2487 (1976). 
2 !d. §§ 2251-2394. Tide II of the Trade Act of 1974 deals with means of providing re-
lief from injury caused by "fair" but injurious import competition. As will become clear later 
in this article, import relief is easier to obtain under Tide II than under previous legislation. 
3 The ITC will institute an investigation upon the filing of a petition for import relief 
by an industry, a firm, a labor group, the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Ways and 
Means Committee, the President, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, or upon 
the initiative of the ITC itself. !d. § 2251(a)(1), (b)(1). 
4 !d. § 2253. 
"!d. § 2251(d)(l)(B). The available adjustment assistance provisions are set forth in id. 
§§ 2271-2374. Trade adjustment assistance for workers, administered by the Secretary of 
Labor, provides benefits up to 70 percent of a worker's average weekly wage for a period of 
12 months, employment counseling, retraining, job search allowances, and advances to assist in 
relocating if necessary for reemployment. !d. §§ 2271-2322. Adjustment for firms, adminis-
tered by the Secretary of Commerce, includes technical assistance and direct loans, or loan 
guarantees to assist such firms to modernize or convert to other manufacturing activities. !d. 
§§ 2341-2354. Adjustment assistance for communities, also administered by the Secretary of 
Commerce, includes technical assistance and loans or loan guarantees to help develop recovery 
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of relief may be the most appropriate remedy in a particular situation. In-
stead, the focus will be on what institutional decision-making structure is 
best suited to determine when import relief is warranted. In order to un-
derstand fully the problems related to trade policy and the allocation of 
decision-making responsibility, it is necessary to outline briefly the history 
and structure of the Trade Act of 197 4. 
Congress has the power to enact legislation concerning international 
trade policy under its plenary constitutional authority to "lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts" and "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.''0 
Despite this power, Congress since 1934 has periodically delegated to the 
President specific and limited power to negotiate reciprocal tariff and trade 
concessions with foreign nations.7 Until the Trade Act of 1974 was passed, 
the most recent congressional delegation of authority to the President to 
negotiate trade agreements was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.8 The 
President's authority under this Act terminated June 30, 1967. 
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, an industry was entitled to 
import relief only when the following four prerequisites were met:9 
(1) imports of an article similar to or competitive with one pro-
duced by the domestic industry were increasing; 
(2) the increased imports were the result of trade agreement 
concessions; 
(3) the domestic industry was suffering injury: and 
(4) the increased imports were the major factor causing or 
threatening to cause the serious injury. 10 
The President under the Act of 1962 was granted absolute discretion to ac-
cept or reject recommendations made by the United States Tariff Commis-
sion. 11 In short, the Tariff Commission's functions concerning import relief 
were investigatory and fact-finding in nature and the Commission lacked 
any effective decisional power. 
Since ultimate power over trade policy was granted to the President 
and the role of the Tariff Commission was merely advisory, the statutory 
scheme of the 1962 Act was at variance with the long recognized view that 
"important advantages derive from congressional delegation of regulatory 
power to specialized agencies which can provide a continuity of surveillance 
and expertise over complex economic matters and that these advantages 
are normally unavailable in the three constitutional branches of govern-
plans, to attract new industry, or to convert existing plants to more economically viable ac-
tivities. I d. §§ 2371-2374. 
6 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
7 See generally Whitney, The Trade Act of 1974: Coping with Unequal Environmmtal Control 
Costs, 16 B.C. IND. & Cm1. L. REv. 577 (1975). 
8 Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (formerly codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 
(1970)). 
9 The prerequisites resulted from the United States Tariff Commission's interpretation 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (formerly 
codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970)). The United States Tariff Commission has been 
changed to the International Trade Commission. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1976). 
10 Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 302(b), 76 Stat. 883 (1962) (formerly codified at 19 U.S.C. § 
1901(b)(1970)). See UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON NONRUD· 
BERFOOTWEAR, INVESTIGATION No. 359 (1971). 
11 Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 302, 76 Stat. 885 (1962) (formerly codified.at 19 U.S.C. § 1902 
(1970)). 
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ment."12 Accordingly, the 1962 Act was anomalous in that the special ex-
pert Commission was given the authority to evaluate complex trade issues 
and reach detailed conclusions, yet it was denied the power to implement 
these findings and conclusions.13 Congress dealt with this anomaly when it 
realigned decision-making responsibility concerning trade policy and tried 
to improve the worsening competitive position of American domestic busi-
ness by enacting the 197 4 legislation. 
Under the 1974 Act, upon receiving an affirmative determination 
from the ITC and a recommendation as to remedies, the President is re-
quired to make his decision within 60 days after receiving the ITC report.14 
In determining whether to provide import relief and what method and 
amount of import relief to provid~, the President must take into account in 
addition to such other considerations as he may deem relevant: 
(1) information and advice from the Secretary of Labor on the 
extent to which workers in the industry have applied for, are re-
ceiving, or are likely to receive adjustment assistance under part 
2 of this subchapter or benefits from other manpower programs; 
(2) information and advice from the Secretary of Commerce on 
the extent to which firms in the industry have applied for, are 
receiving, or are likely to receive adjustment assistance under 
parts 3 and 4 of this subchapter; 
(3) the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to 
promote adjustment, the efforts being made or to be im-
plemented by the industry concerned to adjust to import compe-
tition, and other considerations relative to the position of the in-
dustry in the Nation's economy; 
(4) the effect of import relief on consumers (including the price 
and availability of the imported article and the like or directly 
competitive article produced in the United States) and on compe-
tition in the domestic markets for such articles; 
(5) the effect of import relief on the international economic 
interests of the United States; 
(6) the impact on United States industries and firms as a con-
sequence of any possible modification of duties or other import 
restrictions which may result from international obligations with 
respect to compensation; 
(7) the geographic concentration of imported products marketed 
in the United States; 
(8) the extent to which the United States market is the focal 
point for exports of such article by reason of restraints on ex-
ports of such article to, or on imports of such article into, third 
country markets; and 
(9) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by 
taxpayers, communities, and workers, if import relief were or 
were not provided. 15 
12 Whitney, The Trade Act of 1974: Coping with Unequal Environmental Control Costs, 16 
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 577, 599 (1975). 
13 I d. 
14 19 u.s.c. § 2252(b)(1976). 
15 Id. § 2252(c). 
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Clearly the requirement that the President take into consideration the 
above factors is an important difference from the 1962 legislation which, as 
previously noted, granted the chief executive complete discretion in accept-
ing or rejecting a Tariff Commission recommendation. 
If the President determines not to proclaim the import relief recom-
mended by the ITC, he must report this decision to Congress, which has 
the power to override the President's determination and to effectuate the 
ITC's recommendation by a simple majority vote taken within 90 days of 
the President's report to Congress.16 The provision of the Act giving Con-
gress the power to override the President is one of the clearest indications 
that the legislature intended that the President not be given absolute au-
thority in an area requiring special expertise. 17 
In addition to being procedurally different from the 1962 Act, the 
1974 legislation also includes important substantive changes. Unlike the 
1962 Act, the Trade Act of 1974 does not require establishment of a causal 
link between increased imports and grant of trade agreement concessions.18 
Furthermore, the 1974 Act relaxes the criteria regarding the extent to 
which imports must have contributed to the injury to an industry. Accord-
ingly, the ITC need only find that increased imports are or threaten to be-
come a "substantial cause" of serious injury, 19 a term defined by the Act to 
mean a cause that is "not less than any other cause."20 
16 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l)(l976). 
17 Other changes in the new law are important: the term of office of the Commissioners 
was extended from six to nine years and the chairman and vice-chairman are to be appointed 
on the basis of seniority rather than by presidential designation. Id. § 1330(b)(c). Compensa-
tion for each member of the Commission was increased and, more importantly, the budget of 
the Commission is to be approved directly by Congress rather than by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. Id. § 2232. The 1974 Act also gave the Commission authority to hire its 
own attorneys and to represent itself in all judicial proceedings whereas previously the Com-
mission was required to request the justice Department for such assistance. S. REP. No. 1298, 
93d Gong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). Furthermore, Congress has also ensured that it will be well-
informed when making decisions: 
The Act increases from two to five the number of congressional advisors to be 
appointed from each house to oversee international trade negotiations. The Sen-
ate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee are to nomi-
nate the advisors from among their own respective members, and the nominees 
are to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House. In addition, the Act requires that the Private Advisory Committee 
for Trade Negotiations, a committee chaired by the Special Trade Representative 
and composed of 45 representatives of government, labor, industry, agriculture, 
consumer interests and the general public, be given full access to all data con-
cerning negotiating objectives and the progress of negotiations. The Act further 
requires that the committee issue formal advisory opinions to Congress indicating 
whether pending trade agreements would achieve equity and reciprocity. 
Whitney, The Trade Act of 1974: Coping with Unequal Environmental Control Costs, 16 B.C. IND. & 
CoM. L. REV. 577, 598-99 (1975) (footnotes omitted). For an extended discussion of the Trade 
Act of 1974 and its background see Whitney, supra. 
18 19 u.s.c. § 2251 (1976). 
19 Id. § 225l(b)(l). 
20 Id. § 225l(b)(4). As to workers, the Secretary of Labor must find 
(I) that a significant number or proportion of the workers in such worker's 
firm or an appropriate subdivision of the firm have become totally or partially 
separated, or are threatened to become totally or partially separated, 
(2) that sales or production, or both, of such firm or subdivision have de-
creased absolutely, and 
(3) that increases of imports or articles like or directly competitive with ar-
ticles produced by such worker's firm or an appropriate subdivision thereof "con-
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II. CASE STUDIES OF lTC DECISIONS 
In order to understand why the 1974 Act has not lived up to expecta-
tions, it is necessary to analyze case studies of lTC decisons and the presi-
dential and congressional responses. It will become clear that Presidents 
have ignored lTC recommendations without good reason and that the 
Congress has failed to assert itself by overruling executive decisions. After 
the case studies have been presented, reforms will be suggested which 
would compel the President to give lTC recommendations proper consid-
eration and would conclusively realign the decision-making responsibility 
concerning American import policy. 
A. Presidential Disposition of lTC Recommendations for Import Relief 
1. Specialty Steel 
The earliest ITC investigation which resulted in an affirmative de-
termination and a recommendation of import relief dealt with stainless 
steel and alloy tool steeJ.2 1 This investigation was instituted on August 5, 
1975 upon receipt of a petition filed on July 16, 1975 by the Tool and 
Stainless Steel Industry Committee for Import Relief and the United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CI0.22 The investigation was undertaken to de-
termine whether certain items of steel were being imported into the United 
States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause or threat of 
serious injury to the domestic industry producing articles of steel like or di-
rectly competitive with the imported articles. 23 
After a public hearing and the receipt of briefs submitted by in-
terested parties, the Commission recommended quantitative limitations be-
ginning with calendar year 1976 through calendar year 1980 for the 
specified classes of articles for which affirmative determinations were 
made. 24 The quantitative limit was fixed at the amount of the average an-
nual imports for each of the specified classes of articles-adjusted upward 
to the nearest 100 short tons-for the calendar years 1970 to 1974 inclu-
sive.25 
tributed importantly" to such total or partial separation, or threat thereof, and to 
such decline in sales or production. 
ld. § 2272. For individual firms the Secretary of Commerce must make the same findings as 
those required for relief of worker injury. /d. § 2341(c). The term "contributed importantly" is 
defined as "a cause which is important, but not necessarily more important than any other 
cause." Id. §§ 2272, 234l(c). 
21 UNITED STATI:S INTERNATIONAL TRADE Co~mlSSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN. 
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-5 (january 16, 1976) [hereinafter cited as TA-201-5]. 
22 /d. at I. 
23 Specifically the investigation concerned: 
ingots, blooms, billets, slabs and sheet bars; bars; wire rods; and plates, sheets 
and strip, not cut, not pressed, and not stamped to nonrectangular shape; all the 
foregoing of stainless steel, alloy tool steel, or silicon electrical steel, provided for 
in items 608.18, 608.52, 608.76, 608.78, 608.85, 608.88, 609.06, 609.07 and 
609.08 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), and as additionally 
subject to duty under items 607.01 through 607.04, inclusive of the TSUS. 
/d. Subsequently, on October 3, 1975, the Commission, at the request of the petitioner and for 
other reasons, amended the scope of the investigation by deleting silicon electrical steel pro-
vided for in TSUS items 608.88 and 609.07. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,580 (1975). 
24 TA-201-5, supra note 21, at 4-5. 
25 I d. at 4-6. 
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President Ford did not follow the ITC's recommendations and an-
nounced his intention to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with key 
supplying countries during the ensuing 90 days. However, the President 
indicated that if satisfactory agreements were not negotiated successfully, 
he intended to proclaim import quotas at the overall level recommended by 
the ITC for a period of three years to take effect on June 14, 1976.20 
The President presented two grounds justifying this action. First, he 
concluded that the ITC's five year recommendation was "too inflexible in 
view of the rapid expansions and contractions of the specialty steel market. 
During a recession period, imports would not be sufficiently constrained to 
prevent a recurrence of the problems encountered [in 1975]."27 Second, 
the President asserted that the ITC's remedy "[did] not take into account 
special factors affecting certain foreign supplying countries."28 
The President's failure to follow the ITC's recommendations was ill-
' advised. As to the President's first basis for rejecting the ITC recommenda-
tion, it is difficult to understand how imposition of what is effectively lesser 
import relief (three years stability instead of five), would provide more pro-
tection in case of recession. Moreover, should a recession occur, the quan-
titative limitations recommended by the ITC could be expeditiously adjusted 
on a unilateral basis to meet current conditions. If "flexibility" is critical, as 
the President suggested, then orderly marketing agreements would be less 
appropriate because changes in such agreements would involve further 
bilateral negotiations. Finally, the second so-called "basis" for departing 
from the ITC remedy amounted to little more than preemptory dismissal 
of the ITC recommendation since the President did not disclose the special 
factors affecting certain foreign supplying countries which should have 
been taken into consideration. 
On June 11, 1976, after failing to negotiate satisfactory orderly mar-
keting agreements, President Ford imposed quantitative restrictions on the 
importation of the subject specialty steel items.29 Subsequently, on the basis 
of advice from the ITC and the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, and 
without reciting any substantive reason to justify his decision, President 
Carter announced "that the exclusion of alloy tool steel provided for in 
item 923.25 [of the Tariff Schedules of the United States] from such quan-
titative restrictions is in the national interest."30 The President made no 
pretense of considering the criteria he is required to take into account 
under the 1974 Act, and made a unilateral decision which should have 
been made by the administrative agency possessing expertise in the area. 
Unfortunately, Congress failed to intervene in the controversy concerning 
steel and did not override the President's action. 
2. Footwear 
Upon receipt of a petition filed August 20, 1975 by the American 
Footwear Industries Association, the Boot and Shoe Worker's Union, and 
the United Shoe Workers of America, the ITC instituted an investigation 
26 The President also directed the Secretary of Labor to expedite processing of applica-
tions for trade adjusunent assistance. President's Message to Congress Under Section 203(b)(l) 
of the Trade Act of 1974, H.R. Doc. No. 409, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
27 !d. 
28Jd. 
29 Pres. Proclamation No. 4445, 3 C.F.R. 35, 35 (1976). 
30 Pres. Proclamation No. 4509, 42 Fed. Reg. 30,829, 30,829 (1977). 
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of footwear on September 17, 1975.31 After a public hearing and the re-
ceipt of briefs submitted by interested parties, the Commission determined 
that certain items of footwear were being imported into the United States 
in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to 
the domestic industry or certain industries producing articles like or di-
rectly competitive with the imported articles.32 
While the Commission was unanimous concerning the need for im-
port relief, there was no majority as to what kind of relief should be rec-
ommended. 33 Three members recommended that there be imposed a new 
table of rates of duty structured to prevent or remedy the injury.34 Two 
members recommended the imposition of a tariff-rate quota system for a 
five year period under which existing rates of duty would apply to foot-
wear within the quotas and higher rates of duty would be imposed for im-
ports in excess of quotas.3s Finally, one member suggested that adjustment 
assistance to workers, firms, and communities could remedy the serious in-
jury suffered by the domestic footwear industry.36 
On April 16, 1976, President Ford transmitted to Congress his deci-
sion to provide adjustment assistance to the footwear industry producing 
footwear covered by the affirmative determination of the ITC.37 In this in-
stance, the President made a series of findings which included those re-
quired by section 203(c) of the 1974 Act: 
(1) import restraints would result in higher consumer prices; 
(2) import restraints would expose other industrial and agricul-
tural trade to compensatory import concessions or retaliation 
against exports which would be detrimental to United States jobs 
and exports; 
31 UNITED STATES INTERNATIO:-IAL TRADE Cm!MISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN-
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-7, 1 (February 20, 1976). The investigation was undertaken to de-
termine whether "footwear, provided for in items 700.05 through 700.85, inclusive (except 
items 700.51, 700.52, 700.53, and 700.60), of the Tariff Schedules of the United States," was 
being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause 
of serious injury, or the threat therof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or di-
rectly competitive with the imported article. !d. 
32 !d. at 3. 
33 /d. at 4. 
34 !d. 
3~ !d. 
36 !d. at 6. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Cm!MISSION. REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT ON INVESTIGATI0:-1 No. TA-201-6 (February 18, 1976) [Slide Fasteners and Parts There-
of], in which the ITC was equally divided and made no determination whether imports were 
causing serious injury or a threat thereof. See also UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. T A-20 1-24 Q uly 25, 1977) [Cast 
Iron Stoves], in which the ITC was equally divided (2-2, with one member abstaining and one 
vacancy on the Commission). In this case the two members making an affirmative determina-
tion recommended that the President should suspend designation of the subject stoves from 
eligibility for duty-free treatment under the General System of Preferences. The President did 
not act. See also UNITED STATES INTERNATIO!'IAL TRADE Cm!MISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-4 Qanuary 12, 1976) [Asparagus] in which the ITC was equally 
divided and made no determination. The three members who voted for affirmative determi-
nation in fact recommended imposition of quantitative limitations but the President did not 
act. 
37 President's Message to Congress Under Section 203(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, 
H.R. Doc. No.458, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
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(3) import relief would disproportionately benefit 21 larger firms 
producing 50 percent of domestic output while not helping small 
businesses; 
(4) adjustment assistance would be less inflationary than import 
relief; 
(5) domestic production of footwear was already rising signifi-
cantly without import relief; 
(6) domestic employment was showing signs of recovery; 
(7) imports of the subject footwear had been levelling off; and 
(8) import relief under these circumstances would be contrary to 
the policy of promoting the development of an open, nondis-
criminatory and fair world economic system. 38 
Accordingly, the President directed the Secretaries of Commerce and 
Labor to expedite action on petitions for adjustment assistance and directed 
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to monitor the United 
States footwear trade in collaboration with the Bureau of Census on a 
monthly basis. 39 
In the year following President Ford's decision, conditions in the 
footwear manufacturing industry deteriorated and the efficacy of adjust-
ment assistance was so effectively challenged that President C~rter directed 
the Departments of Commerce and Labor, together with the Special Trade 
representative, to work out a new and effective Federal Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Program. 40 
On October 5, 1976, the ITC, in response to a Senate Finance Com-
mittee resolution directing it to conduct another investigation of footwear, 
agreed that there was "good cause" within the meaning of the 1974 Act41 
to reinvestigate the footwear industry within one year of reporting to the 
President on the results of a like investigation. 42 After hearings, briefs and 
argument from all interested parties, the ITC unanimously reached an af-
firmative determination that the subject footwear was being imported into 
the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of 
serious injury to domestic producers.43 
A majority of four Commission members agreed that to prevent or 
remedy the injury found to exist, it was necessary to impose a tariff-rate 
quota system on the subject footwear for the ensuing five year period.44 
38 !d. See text at note I5 supra for the requirements of § 203(c) of the 1974 Act, 19 
U.S.C. § 2252(c) (I976). 
39 President's Message to Congress under Section 203(b)(I) of the Trade Act of 1974, 
H.R. Doc. No. 458, 94th Gong., 2d Sess. (I976). See also Memorandum for Special Repre· 
sentative for Trade Negotiations, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1976). 
40 13 WEEKLY Cm!P. OF PRES. Doc. 882, 883 Qune 14, 1977). 
41 19 U.S.C. § 225I(e) (I976) provides: 
Except for good cause determined by the Commission to exist, no investigation 
for the purposes of this section shall be made with respect to the same subject 
matter as a previous investigation under this section, unless I year has elapsed 
since the Commission made its report to the President of the results of such pre· 
vious investigation. , 
42 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Cm!mSSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON lN. 
VESTIGATION No. TA-20I-I8, I (February 8, 1977) [hereinafter cited as TA-20I-I8]. 
43 /d. at 4. 
44fd. 
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Under this system, the existing rates of duty would apply to footwear 
within the quotas which were established and allocated to countries on the 
basis of historic market participation. 45 Shipments in excess of this quota 
would be charged higher rates of duty. 
Rejecting the lTC recommendation, President Carter announced his 
intention to negotiate orderly marketing agreements,46 and on June 22, 
1977 anneunced the signing of agreements with the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) and the Republic of Korea.47 These agreements, effective June 
28, 1977, permitted imports from these countries at a level of the "average 
annual quantity or value of such articles imported into the United States 
from the Republic of Korea, and from the Republic of China, in the 
1974-76 period .... "48 The President also delegated to the Special Repre-
sentative for Trade Negotiations his authority under section 203(e) of the 
1974 Act to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with other foreign 
suppliers after import relief was into effect against those countries which 
had not entered into an orderly marketing agreement.49 The Special Rep-
reseq.tative was given the power to terminate any agreement in the event 
that the restraint levels specified in the agreements were exceeded, or in 
the event that imports from countries not parties to such agreements in-
creased and disrupted the effectiveness of the agreements. In addition, if 
imports increased from other non-agreement countries and disrupted the 
agreements, the Special Representative, after initiating consultations with 
the disrupting country, could "prevent further entry of such articles for the 
remainder of that restraint period or may otherwise moderate or restrict 
imports of such articles from such countries pursuant to section 203(g)(2) 
of the Trade Act" after consultation with representatives of the member 
agencies of the Trade Policy Staff Committee.50 As was the case with the 
steel investigation, the intent of the 1974 Act was frustrated since the rec-
ommendations of the ITC were ignored and decisions were instead made 
by the President and his staff. 
4:; /d. at 5. 
4
" Pres. Proclamation No. 4510, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,430, 32,430 (1977). 
47 !d. at 32,432. The "Big Five" of foreign producers exporting footwear to the United 
States are: 
Country 
Republic of China (Taiwan) 
Italy 
Spain 
Brazil 
Republic of Korea 
TA-201-18, supra note 42, at 5. 
Quota Quantity (1 ,000 pairs) 
88,284 
62,603 
35,033 
21,324 
9,202 
4
" Pres. Proclamation No. 4510, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,429, 32,431-32 (1977). 
49 /d. 
:;u !d. Section 203(g)(2) of the 1974 Act provides that the President may "prescribe regu-
lations governing the entry or withdrawal from warehouses of articles covered by such [or-
derly marketing] agreements." 19 U.S.C. § 2253(g)(2) (1976). Section 203(e)(1) requires import 
relief to be proclaimed and take effect 90 days after a presidential determination to negotiate 
orderly marketing agreements. /d. § 2253(e)(1). Thus, as to those countries not negotiating 
such agreements, the lTC tariff rate quotas would apply. Such countries can continue to ex-
port to the United States products in excess of the quotas despite incurring the higher tariff 
rate for the amount imported that exceeds their quota. 
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3. Flatware 
This was another proceeding in which the ITC made an affirmative 
determination but could not muster a majority agreement as to what kind 
of import relief was appropriate. 51 Three members recommended tariff~ 
rate quota restrictions imposing higher tariffs on imports exceeding 
specified quotas, two members recommended trade adjustment assistance, 
and one member recommended continuation of existing tariff {}Uotas but 
without country-by-country quota allocations. 5 2 
President Ford decided to provide adjustment assistance to the United 
States stainless steel table flatware industry producing flatware covered by 
the affirmative determination of the ITC. He rejected import relief and re-
cited in substantially abbreviated form the factors on which he had relied in 
the footwear investigation, that is, higher prices to consumers, inflationary 
impact, exposure of other United States industry and agriculture to retalia-
tion, resulting adverse impacts on jobs, undue benefit to large manufac-
turers and negligible help to small enterprises, and what became the stan-
dard closing invocation-the United States policy of promoting the qevel-
opment of an open, nondiscriminatory and fair world economic system. 53 
The reasons given by the President are as faulty as they were concerning 
footwear investigation, and American trade policy would have been better 
served had it been formulated by the experts working with the ITC. 
4. Shrimp 
The ITC instituted an investigation of shrimp on December 11, 1975, 
following receipt of a petition filed on November 17, 1975 by the National 
Shrimp Congress, to determine whether items of shrimp, fresh, chilled, 
frozen, prepared, or preserved (including pastes and sauces) were being 
imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a sub-
stantial cause or threat of serious injury to the shrimp industry of the 
United States. 54 This proceeding provided a further variation of possible 
Commission alignments. Two members determined that the shrimp in 
question was being imported into the United States in such increased quan-
tities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry; 
two members made a negative determination; one abstained; and one de~ 
termined affirmately as to the shrimp-fishing industry but determined 
negatively as to the shrimp-processing industry.55 Thus, there was a 
m<Uority-3 of the 5 members participating-for an affirmative determina~ 
tion as to the shrimp-fishing industry. 
The majority recommended adjustment assistance under Chapters 2, 
3, and 4 of Title II of the 1974 Act.56 On May 17, 1977, in an unpublished 
directive, President Carter authorized the submission and processing of pe-
titions for adjustment by the shrimp-fishing industry. As should be becom-
ing clear from this case study analysis, the President's acceptance of the 
51 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN· 
VESTJGATION No. TA-20I-8, I (March I, I976). 
52 Id. at 5-6. 
53 Pres. Proclamation No. 4436, 3 C.F.R. 26, 26-27 (I976). 
54 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN· 
VESTJGATION No. TA-201-12, I (May 21, 1976). Specifically the investigation concerned item 
144.45 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. /d. 
55 Jd. 
56 /d. at 2. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Title II are codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 227I-2374 
(1976). See note 5 supra. 
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lTC recommendations without change is the exception rather than the 
rule. 
5. Mushrooms 
The lTC, pursuant to a petition filed by the Mushroom Canners 
Committee of the Pennsylvania Food Processors Association and the Mush-
room Processors Tariff Committee on September 17, 1975, instituted an 
investigation concerning items of mushrooms. 57 Mter hearings, briefs, and 
arguments the Commission by a three to two vote with one absention made 
an affirmative determination and recommended adjustment assistance. 58 
Despite the adjustment assistance recommended by the Commission, 
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations pursuant to the direction 
of the President, requested the lTC in a letter to institute an expedited in-
vestigation of mushrooms under section 201(b)(1) of the 1974 Act.59 The 
lTC determined that good cause existed for a reinvestigation within one 
year of the earlier report on mushrooms, and accordingly instituted the re-
quested investigation on October 5, 1976.60 The lTC held further hearings, 
received arguments and briefs from interested parties, and this time, by a 
vote of four to one with one abstention, again made an affirmative deter-
mination. A majority of three commissioners recommended that to prevent 
the injury it was necessary to impose a tariff-rate-quota system for a five 
year period for the subject mushrooms with existing rates of duty applying 
to imports within the designated tariff quotas and higher rates for imports 
in excess of quotas fixed on a country-by-country basis.61 Two members 
voted for adjustment assistance and one abstained.62 
On March 10, 1977, President Carter transmitted to Congress his de-
cision not to impose the recommended import relief. 63 Apart from the now 
standard recital about price impact on consumers and potential retaliation, 
the proclamation cited recent unspecified "improvements" in the mush-
room industry, the fact that only 100 jobs were at stake, the existence of 
voluntary export restraints by the two leading foreign suppliers (the Repub-
lics of China and Korea), and a determination to continue to monitor both 
the conditions in the industry and the availability of "consultations" with 
any foreign government that becomes a "disruptive factor" in the United 
States market.64 Here again, the expertise of the lTC was ignored by the 
President who despite the changes in the 197 4 legislation, was still able uni-
laterally to change import policy. 
57 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO~IMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN-
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-10, I (March 17, 1976). Specifically the investigation concerned item 
144.20 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. I d. 
"" Id. at 2. Curiously, two of the three members comprising the majority making the af-
firmative determination were joined by one member voting for a negative determination to 
constitute a m;Uority of three favoring adjustment assistance. The other member comprising 
the original majority of three voting for an affirmative determination opted for a five year 
program of tariff-rate quotas. I d. 
5n UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO~IMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN-
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-17, 1 (January 10, 1977) [hereinafter cited as TA-201-17]. 
00 Id. 
01 I d. at 3. Again, the member voting for negative determination joined the majority as 
to the recommendation of import relief. See note 58 supra. 
02 TA-201-17, supra note 59, at 4. 
63 President's Message to Congress Under Section 203(b)(l) of Trade Act of 1974, H.R. 
Doc. No. 96, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976). 
64 I d. 
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6. Honey 
The ITC, as a result of a petition filed December 29, 1975 by the 
American Honey Producers Association, instituted an investigation on Jan-
uary 29, 1976 concerning honey.65 Four public hearings were held in vari-
ous parts of the United States and the case was briefed and argued. The 
ITC, by a vote of three to two, one member abstaining, made an affirma-
tive determination that imports were a substantial cause or a threat of seri-
ous injury to the domestic honey industry. 66 The majority recommended 
that "whenever, in calendar year 1976, or in any of the four ensuing calen-
dar years, the aggregate quantity of imports of honey, as provided for in 
item 155.70 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, exceeds a tariff-
rate quota of 30 million pounds, honey imported during the remainder of 
such calendar year shall be subject to rates of duty" which are additional to 
existing duties and are specified in an ensuing table which imposes an ad 
valorem schedule of duties. 67 
On August 28, 1976, President Ford announced his intention to deny 
the recommended import relief and to provide adjustment assistance if the 
honey industry qualified.68 In addition to the formulary recital of factors 
considered-higher consumer prices, inflation, possible trade retaliation, 
and the policy of development of an "open and fair world economic 
system" -the proclamation set forth two paragraphs of detailed economic 
data which purported to contradict the validity of the ITC's determination 
that imports were a substantial cause or a threat of serious injury to the 
commercial honey producers. 69 This was the first of the affirmative deter-
mination cases in which the presidential proclamation undertook more than 
formulary recital of findings or summary statement of conclusions. 
Subsequently, on October I, 1976, Senator Humphrey on behalf of 
himself and Senators Bentson, McGovern and Nelson submitted Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 210.70 The proposed resolution, which was referred 
to the Committee on Finance, expressed disapproval of "the determination 
of the President under section 203 of the Trade Act of 197 4 transmitted to 
the Congress on August 28, 1976."71 Senator Humphrey advanced detailed 
economic arguments in support of the resolution. 72 However, on February 
22, 1977, the Committee on Finance voted to report negatively on the reso-
lution73 and on March 10, 1977 voted to postpone further consideration of 
the matter indefinitely.74 The House Ways and Means Committee likewise 
refused to override the President.75 
65 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN. 
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-14, I Gune 29, 1976) [hereinafter cited as TA-201-14]. Specifically 
the investigation concerned item 155.70 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.ld. at I. 
66 !d. at 3. 
67 !d. at 3-4. 
68 Memorandum for the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 3 C.F.R. 189, 
189 (1976). 
1976). 
69 /d. at 189-90. 
70 S. CoN. RES. No. 210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNG. REC. 517,871 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 
71 Id. 
72 /d. atSI7,872. 
73 Minutes of Senate Finance Committee, February 22, 1977. 
74 /d., March 10, 1977. 
75 Import Relief to the Domestic Honey Industry: Hearings on H. Con. Res. 80 Before the Sub-
Com. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also H.R. 
REP. No. 95-25, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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The Congress' refusal to challenge the President's decision in the 
honey case is further evidence that the 1974 Act is not accomplishing its 
objectives. In most situations, there has been no serious effort to muster 
enough votes to override and, in this case where a serious effort was made 
by prominent senators, the effort failed. Unfortunately, the draftsmen of 
the 197 4 Act were probably overly optimistic in expecting Congress to 
serve as an effective check on Presidential authority in the field of trade 
policy. 
7. Sugar 
On the basis of an investigation instituted on September 21, 1976 as 
the result of a resolution of the Committee on Finance of the United States 
Senate, the lTC determined that items of sugars, sirups, and molasses, de-
rived from sugar cane or sugar beets were being imported in such increased 
quantities as to be a substantial threat of serious injury to the domestic in-
dustry.76 Three members recommended a quantitative restriction of 4.275 
million short tons for calendar year 1977 through calendar year 1981, to be 
allocated among supplying countries on a basis to be ,determined by the 
President as equitable; two members recommended a quota of 4.4 million 
short tons per year through 1979, to be allocated by auctioning non-
transferable import licenses; and one member recommended a quota of 4.4 
million short tons per year through 1981, to be allocated on the basis of a 
specified table of entitlement. 77 
On May 4, 1977, President Carter announced his determination that 
import relief for the sugar industry was not in the national economic inter-
est. 78 Apart from the ritual recital of undocumented ultimate "findings," 
the only additional reason given for the decision was that import relief 
might jeopardize the success of pending negotiations for an International 
Sugar Agreement.79 This statement ignores the fact that the United States 
operated under a quota system for 30 years (1934-1974) which adequately 
protected domestic producers without jeopardizing the various interna-
tional agreements negotiated during that period.80 The efficacy of the 
'jeopardy" argument is further weakened by the President's subsequent 
76 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN-
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-16, 1 (March 17, 1977). The lTC instituted the investigation 
I d. 
to determine whether sugar beets and sugar cane; sugars, sirups, and molasses, 
derived from sugar cane or sugar beets; and sugars, sirups, and molasses, de-
scribed in subpart of A of part 10 of schedule 1 of the Tariff Schedules of the 
United States (TSUS), flavored; and sirups, flavored or unflavored, consisting of 
blends of any of the products described in aforementioned subpart A; all the 
foregoing provided for in items 155.10 through 155.31, inclusive, and item 
155.75 of the TSUS, [were] being imported into the United States in such in-
creased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat 
thereof, tq the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive 
with the imported article. 
On the basis of its investigation the lTC determined that "sugars, sirups, and molasses, 
derived from sugar cane or sugar beets, provided for in items 155.20 and 155.30 of the TSUS 
were being imported in such increased quantities as to be a substantial threat of serious injury 
to the domestic industry." ld. at 3 (emphasis added). As to the other items encompassed on 
the investigation, the lTC either made no determination, or a negative determination. 
77 Jd. at 5-7. 
78 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 658, 658 (May 4, 1977). 
79 !d. 
80 See 14 WEEKLY Co~!P. OF PRES. Doc. 219, 219 Qan. 25, 1978). 
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imposition of a tariff rate increase and imposition of import fees during 
the pendency of these negotiations. 81 Certainly this decision will have no 
less an impact on negotiations than would have a May 1977 decision to in-
stitute import relief. In lieu of import relief, the President directed the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to institute an income support program for sugar 
producers to be effective with the 1977 crop, whereby supplemental pay-
ments of a maximum of two cents per pound would be paid whenever the 
market price falls below thirteen and one half cents per pound. 82 
On September 29, 1977, Congress enacted legislation providing what 
it considered more effective price support to domestic sugar producers.83 
Neither the presidential nor congressional price support program was ef-
fective and on November 12, 1977 President Carter announced that the 
Secretary of Agriculture had advised him that the sugar items in question 
"are being, or are practically certain to be, imported into the United States 
under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render 
ineffective, or to materially interfere with, the price support operations 
now being conducted by the Department of Agriculture."84 Accordingly, 
the President ordered both an increase in the rate of tariff and an import 
fee, "without awaiting the recommendations of the United States Interna-
tion Trade Commission with respect to such action."85 Thereafter, on Jan-
uary 20, 1978, the President announced that the Secretary of Agriculture 
had once again advised him that sugar was still being imported in such 
quantities as to endanger the price support program.86 Accordingly, the 
President ordered an increase in the import fees on sugar.87 
Finally, on January 25, 1978, the President announced the signing of 
an International Sugar Agreement which will undertake to stabilize world 
prices between 11 and 21 cents per pound by a world wide system of ex-
port quotas.88 The President noted, "[o]nce in full operation, it should 
eliminate the need for the tariff and fee measures recently imposed to de-
fend our domestic price support program."89 
8. Television 
The ITC, as a res~lt of a petition filed on September 22, 1976 by 
eleven labor unions and five manufacturers, instituted an investigation on 
October 21, 1976 to determine whether "items of television receivers, color 
and monochrome, assembled or not assembled, finished or not finished, 
and subassemblies thereof' were being imported in such increased quan-
tities as to be a substantial cause or threat of serious injury.90 Three com-
missioners determined affirmatively as to all of the television items in ques-
81 13 WEEKLYCO~IP. OF PRES. Doc. 1773, 1773 (Nov. 11, 1977). 
82 13 WEEKLY Cm!P. OF PRES. Doc. 658, 658 (May 4, 1977). 
83 The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977). 
84 Pres. Proclamation No. 4538, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,037, 59,037 (1977). 
85 I d. This increase is additional to a tariff rate increase imposed by Pres. Proclamation 
No. 4334, 3 C.F.R. 420 (1974). The President also directed the lTC to institute a further in-
vestigation. Pres. Proclamation No. 4538, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,037, 59,037 (1977). 
86 Pres. Proclamation No. 4539, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,039, 59,039 (1977). 
87 14 WEEKLY Cm!P OF PRES. Doc. 219, 219 Oan. 25, 1978). 
86 Id. 
69 Id. 
90 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Cm!MISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN. 
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-19, 1 (March 22, 1977). Specifically the investigation concerned item 
685.20 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. I d. at 1. 
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tion that substantial i~ury was resulting; two commissioners determined af-
firmatively that color television, complete and incomplete, was threatened 
with serious injury; and one member determined affirmatively that color 
television receivers, assembled or not assembled, finished or not finished, 
were being imported in such quantities as to be a substantial cause of seri-
ous injury to the domestic industry.91 
The aforementioned three member bloc recommended imposition of 
additional rates of duty over the existing rate of duty for the next five 
years at the level of twenty percent the first two years, fifteen percent for 
the next two ensuing years, and ten percent the fifth year; the aforemen-
tioned two member bloc recommended identical relief but confined it to 
color television receivers, complete or incomplete; the aforementioned 
single member recommended imposition of a quantitative restriction of 
1,272,000 units per annum on a global basis, with quarterly limitations, to 
be increased at the rate of five percent per year for each year in which the 
quota is in effect. 92 
On June 24, 1977, President Carter announced that as to mono-
chrome televison he interpreted the lTC as being evenly divided and he 
opted "to accept the determination of those commissioners making no de-
termination of injury to the monochrome television receiver industry as the 
determination of the Commission and to accept the determination of those 
commissioners finding serious injury to that portion of the industry pro-
ducing subassemblies of color television receivers as the determination of 
the Commission."93 However, the President rejected the recommended im-
port relief and determined "to .remedy the serious injury found to exist by 
the USITC through the negotiation of an orderly marketing agreement 
with Japan, the major supplier of color television receivers to the U.S. 
Market."94 An orderly marketing agreement was concluded with Japan on 
May 20, 1977 restricting imports for a period of three years beginning July 
1, 1977 to 1.75 million units in each annual restraint period.95 
9. Iron Blue Pigments 
The lTC, as a result of a petition filed on October 2, 1975 by Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co., instituted an investigation on October 30 concerning 
the importation of ferrocyanide and ferrocyanide blue pigments.96 On the 
basis of its investigation, three members of the ITC determined that in-
creased imports were a threat of serious injury, two members found in-
creased imports to be a substantial cause of serious injury and one member 
made a negative determination.9.7 The five members reaching an affirma-
tive determination recommended increased rates of tariff above existing 
rates for a five year period. 98 
~ 1 ld. at 3. 
n1d. at 4-5. 
93 Pres. Proclamation No. 4511, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,747, 32,748 (1977). 
94Jd. 
9~ I d. at 32,748-49. 
96 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IN-
VESTIGATION No. TA-201-11, 1 (April 2, 1976). Specifically the investigation concerned item 
473.28 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. I d. 
97 I d. at 3. 
OS Jd. 
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On May 31, 1976, President Ford announced that he had determined 
that the relief recommended by the ITC was not in the national interest. 99 
One of the principal reasons for this decision, apart from the undoc-
umented recitation of ultimate conclusions, was that "[t]he great bulk of 
domestic iron blue pigments production is accounted for by two large 
multi-product firms whose overall operations in recent years showed grow-
ing profits except in the 1975 recession .... With the resources available to 
such large producers, they should be able to finance any investment neces-
sary to improve their competitive position vis-a-vis imports without tariff re-
lief."100 The President did provide for applications for adjustment assis-
tance if necessary due to unemployment. 101 Thus, the adverse impacts of 
foreign trade were to be jointly absorbed by industry and the American 
taxpayer. Once again it becomes clear that the 1974 Act accomplished little 
towards improving American trade policy and changing the allocation of 
decision-making responsibility. 
10. Pending Cases 
There are three ITC reports awaiting presidential action as of Febru-
ary 15, 1978.102 In each investigation the ITC has made an affirmative de-
termination and in two of the three cases has mustered a majority of mem-
bers in agreement as to the appropriate import relief. 
B. Need for Further Reforrn 
As can be seen by an analysis of the decided investigations, the Trade 
Act of 197 4 unfortunately has not been very effective and there is need for 
further reform. Presidents have largely ignored ITC recommendations and 
have failed to explain and document their findings. Furthermore, the Con-
gress has failed to exert a significant influence on United States import pol-
icy since the enactment of the 1974 Act. 
Of the nine investigations completed since the enactment of the 1974 
Act in which the ITC has made affirmative determinations and mustered a 
majority agreement on what import relief should be implemented, in only 
three cases, specialty ste~l, shrimp and footwear, did the President ulti-
mately adopt the import relief recommended by the ITC. In two of the 
three cases, the presidential adoption was only part of the relief the ITC 
recommended. In the case of specialty steel, the President imposed quan-
titative restrictions only after he had failed to negotiate orderly marketing 
agreements, and since imposing the restrictions he has whittled away at the 
scope of the protection. In the footwear case, the President succeeded in 
99 Presidential Memorandum, 3 C.F.R. 181, 181 (1976). 
100 /d. (emphasis added). 
101 !d. 
102 The three cases are UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Co~IMISSION, REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-28 (December 1, 1978) [High Carbon Ferro-
chromium], in which a majority made an affirmative determination and proposed additional 
rates of duty as the remedy; UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE Co~IMISSION, REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-27 (December 12, 1978) [Bolts, Nuts and Large 
Screws of Iron or Steel], in which a majority made an affirmative determination and proposed 
increased rates of duty as the remedy; and UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE CoMMISSION, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-29 (February 2, 1978) (Citizens Band 
(CB) Radio Transceivers], in which a majority made an affirmative determination but divided 
(3-3) as to what import relief should be adopted. 
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negotiating orderly marketing agreements with two of the "Big Five" com-
petitors. In the case of shrimp, the President and the ITC agreed that ad-
justment assistance was appropriate. 
The case of sugar is unique. Mter originally rejecting quantitative re-
strictions recommended by the ITC, the President instead proposed ad-
justment assistance in the form of price supports. When price supports 
proved inadequate, the President was compelled to increase the tariff and 
to impose import fees. Thus, having initially rejected the sugar quotas rec-
ommended by the ITC, current presidential policy appears to rely on a sys-
tem of world quotas bolstered by the congressional price support program 
authorized by the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977.103 
In the remaining six cases, the President has successfully ignored the 
ITC recommendations for import relief despite the provisions for accoun-
tability to Congress contained in the 197 4 Act. In only one of these six 
cases, the honey investigation, 104 did the Congress sustain the President's 
position.105 
Equally disturbing is the manner in which the President has overrid-
den the lTC. The proclamations announcing overrides contain mostly 
ritual recitals of the findings required by the 197 4 Act with virtually no 
supporting documentation. In many instances the proclamations do not 
contain a complete recital of the required ultimate findings. In contrast, the 
lTC reports are extensively documented by evidence adduced at public 
hearings and informed by the filing of adversary briefs and argument. The 
lTC members are supported by an expert technical staff and by an ac-
cumulated expertise in dealing with the substantive aspects of trade disputes. 
The ITC reports are also supported by field work and interviews con-
ducted by its staff, by information from other relevant federal agencies and 
by information obtained by systematic questionnaires. It is also important to 
note that in only one case, the honey investigation, has Congress even 
undertaken a resolution to override the President.106 Given the ovenvhelm-
ing workload of the Congress, it is not remarkable that it has not exercised 
its override powers more frequently. The President's rejection of most ITC 
recommendations and Congress' inability to exert influence concerning 
trade policy strongly indicate the need for further reform if the objective 
of liberalized and effective import relief is to be realized. To this end, Con-
gress should amend the 197 4 Act to make the decision of the ITC granting 
import relief final unless the President assumes the burden of proof before 
the Congressional Oversight Committee107 that another course of action 
should be adopted. This arrangement would offer several significant ad-
vantages. First, it would compel the President when he differs with the ITC 
to document his disagreement with probative, substantive evidence. Under 
the present system, the lTC produces a detailed factual exposition to sup-
port its determination and recommendations. Yet, the President has over-
ruled these considered decisions in summary fashion supported in most 
cases only by formulary recitals of findings. Under the proposed system, 
J03 Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977). 
1°4 TA-201-14, supra note 65. 
10:; H.R. REP. No. 25, 95 Cong., lst Sess. (1977). 
106 S. CoN. RE.S. No. 210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. Sl7,871 (daily ed. Oct. I, 
1976). 
101 See note 17 supra. 
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when differences arise between the ITC and the President, the differences 
would be resolved on the basis of fully documented presentations from 
both the President and the ITC. Inescapably, the quality of analysis, both at 
the ITC and in the White House, would benefit from this proposed change 
in legislation. 
The second major advantage of this proposal would be the elimina-
tion of the President's reliance on undisclosed foreign policy and political 
considerations which motivate the President in the discharge of his trade 
responsibilities. If the President were required to adduce and document 
persuasive, substantive reasons for his proposed override of an ITC deci-
sion, this would assure that the presidential position prevails only on the 
merits and not because of undisclosed political or foreign policy objectives 
that are not legally germane to trade policy decision-making. 
A third advantage would be that this system would "de-politicize" the 
present process. When an industry receives an ITC recommendation for im-
port relief and the President overrides the recommendation, the only recourse 
the industry currently has is to organize, if possible, political pressure, usually 
in the Congress. Normally the larger and more affluent industries are able to 
lobby effectively in Congress, and smaller, more vulnerable industries are less 
able to exert the pressure necessary to redress the situation. 
Another, and perhaps more speculative, advantage would be that such a 
system, by requiring detailed substantive reasons, would probably reduce the 
number of attempted Presidential overrides and thereby reduce the workload 
of the Joint Congressional Oversight group. 
CONCLUSION 
The innovations in the 1974 Act which sought to liberalize access to 
import relief, to strengthen the ITC's independence, and to make the President 
more accountable by an increased congressional oversight of his disposition of 
ITC recommendations were inspired by the perception that the United States 
position in world trade was seriously deteriorating. After World War II, the 
United States premised its trade and monetary policies upon the assumption 
that it could sustain a balance of trade surplus. By 1966 this was no longer the 
case.108 Moreover, during the decade of the 1960's United States worker 
productivity-output per man-hour for manufacturing employees-was de-
clining, domestic prices and wages were increasing steeply, and by 1970 the 
effective rate of exchange of the United States dollar had declined. 
In the period since enactment of the 197 4 Act, the foregoing situation has 
worsened, chiefly as a result of the steeply increased cost of energy due to 
OPEC price increases, but also due to some extent to increased prices for basic 
commodities from "Third World" countries. Continued unacceptable levels of 
108 Until the 1974 Act, import statistics were collected and reported on a free on board 
(f.o.b.) basis which, because it excludes the cost of freight and insurance, produces an under-
statement of total costs actually incurred. Since the 1974 Act, import statistics must be re-
ported on a cost, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) basis, bringing United States practice into har-
mony with the practice of most other industrialized nations and the International Monetary 
Fund. Thus, during the entire decade of the 1960s there appeared to be a surplus on the f.o.b. 
basis, whereas since 1966 there has in fact been a deficit. Moreover, United States export statis-
tics have been further overstated Because of the inclusion of exports that arc more in the na-
ture of aid rather than trade. 
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inflation and unemployment aggravate the problem. Additionally, Congress 
has become increasingly concerned with the enormous cost of compliance with 
United States environmental laws and regulations, 109 and with the effect of this 
on the ability of United States producers to compete effectively with foreign 
producers. 110 
It is probable, therefore, that given these worsened conditions, Congress 
would be all the more eager to assure that the counterforces it attempted to set 
in play in 1974 should be effectively implemented at this time. Simply compel-
ling the President to assume the burden of proof whenever he opposed an lTC 
recommendation would be the simplest and most effective means of correcting 
the deficiency in the present trade decision-making procedure. The objectives 
of Congress in the 197 4 Act would no longer be thwarted and the quality of the 
substantive analysis on which United States trade policy is based would inevita-
bly be enhanced. 
109 Congress enacted provisions in the Ta.x Reform Act of 1976 which provide for a 
special environmental investment ta.>: credit. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2112, 90 Stat. 1521 (1976). 
President Carter has recognized the need for doubling this environment investment tax credit. 
Proposed Ta.x Reform, Message from the President, 124 CONG. REC. 5236 (1978). See also 
Whitney, Capital Fonnation Options to Finance Pollution Control, 3 COLUM.j. ENVTL L. 42 (1976). 
110 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
§ 6, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
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